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Abstract
In a static environment, optional participation and a local agglomeration of
cooperators are found to be beneficial for the occurrence and maintenance
of cooperation. In the optional public goods game, the rock-scissors-paper
cycles of different strategies yield oscillatory cooperation but not stable co-
operation. In this paper, by incorporating population density and individual
mobility into the spatial optional public goods game, we study the coevolu-
tionary dynamics of strategy updating and benefit-seeking migration. With
low population density and slow movement, an optimal level of cooperation
is easy to be reached. An increase in population density and speed-up of
free-floating of competitive agents will suppress cooperation. A log-log re-
lation between the levels of cooperation and the free-floating probability is
found. Theoretical analysis indicates that the decrease of cooperator fre-
quency in the present model should result from the increased interactions
between different agents, which may originate from the increased cluster size
or the speed-up of random-movement.
Keywords: mobility, cooperation, population density, public goods games
Email address: zlxxwj@163.com (Li-Xin Zhonga)
Preprint submitted to Chaos, Solitons and Fractals for publication June 24, 2018
1. Introduction
Social dilemmas describe conflict situations existing between a rational
individual maximizing its own benefit and a social group pursuing collective
wellbeing[1, 2]. For example, as a sheepherder enjoys herding in the public
greenland, the joint effort to achieve environmental sustainability suffers a
heavy blow. The gas emission from a factory promoting its prosperity makes
the greenhouse problem become more serious, which in turn does harm to
the further development of the factory. As everyone faces the temptation to
exploit the public goods and make no contribution to society, the immense
benefit that can only be got through mutual cooperation becomes unattain-
able. This poses a challenging problem about how the individual selfishness
can lead to the occurrence and maintenance of cooperation commonly found
in reality. To answer this question, various mechanisms have been introduced
by scientists since Darwin[3, 4, 5, 6].
Most studies on the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals
are based on game models, the spatial ultimatum game[7], the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game(PDG)[8, 9, 10, 11], the snowdrift game (SG)[12, 13, 14, 15,
16], and the public goods game (PGG)[17, 18, 19], to name just a few. The
iterated PDG models the interactions between two agents, in which one’s
contribution favors the other but not itself. Although the total income would
be the highest if they both cooperate, each agent tends to defect to maximize
its own profit. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is to defect in all rounds.
The PGG is an extension of the PDG to an arbitrary number of agents. In
the original PGG, a group of individuals have the choice whether to make
an investment into a common pool or not. An equal division of returns
irrespective of one’s contribution results in the situation where the defectors
have an advantage over the cooperators and defection becomes a dominant
strategy. To refrain from getting stuck in the deadlocks of mutual defection,
a third strategy, termed a loner’s strategy[20, 21, 22, 23], has been introduced
into the original public goods game.
In the public goods game with loners, also known as the optional public
goods game (OPGG)[24], the agents have an option whether to participate
in the public goods game or not. Those who join the public goods game get
a cooperator’s payoff PC or a defector’s payoff PD, and those who do not
join the public goods game get a loner’s payoff PL. Because a loner only
gets a small but fixed payoff, it can win over a group of defectors but will
be defeated by a group of cooperators. Therefore, an endless rock-scissors-
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paper cycle occurs: Loners will invade a population of defectors with fewer
cooperators. Cooperators will thrive in a population of loners. A population
of cooperators will be intruded by defectors.
Over the past decade, advances in statistical physics have fueled great
interests in constructing a theory of complexity [25], among which researches
on the three-state systems have attained great achievements. The voluntary
prisoner’s dilemma, the rock-scissors-paper game, the cyclic predator-prey
model, the three-state Potts model and the three-state cyclic voter model
are commonly used models[26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Depending upon pair
approximations and mean-field theories, Szabo et al. have theoretically ana-
lyzed the cyclic dominance in evolutionary dynamics. It has been found that
the symmetric solution of mean-field approximation is stable, but it is not
asymptotically stable[33]. As to the stationary solutions of the pair approx-
imation, it has been found that they are unstable for small perturbations,
which can be eliminated by using the four- and nine-site approximations[29].
In the optional public goods game, although the existence of loners keeps
the cooperators from being doomed, the cyclic oscillation of the three strate-
gies indicates that a higher and stable level of cooperation is difficult to be
reached in such a system. But in real world, cooperation is often the domi-
nant strategy in animal and human activities and an environmental change
will lead to the occurrence of different levels of cooperation. The environmen-
tal conditions include the structured space[34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39], the popula-
tion density[40, 41, 42, 43], and the mobility of the individuals[44, 45, 46, 47].
To find out the mechanisms determining the occurrence of different levels of
cooperation in real world, it requires generalizing the model presented by
Hauert et al. and incorporating the environmental conditions into the origi-
nal OPGG [20].
In natural and human society, the linkage between the agents may dynam-
ically evolve[48, 49], the structured space is not fully occupied and random
and purposive movements often occur[50, 51, 52, 53]. Such as the migration
of birds, the floating of a boat and the motion of a train. Similar dynamic
processes have been found in diffusion systems[54, 55]. X.Chen et al. have
studied the role of risk-driven migration in the evolution of cooperation[56].
Z.Wang et al. have investigated the impact of population density on the
evolution of cooperation based on different game models[42, 57]. Z.H.Liu
has studied the influence of population density and individual mobility on
epidemic spreading[58]. C.P.Roca et al. and J.Y.Wakano et al. have studied
the roles of mobility in the improvement of cooperation in the PGG and in
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the ecological PGG respectively[59, 43]. Related studies have shown that, in
the structured space, the percolation threshold plays a quite important role
in the widespread of cooperation and the outbreak of diseases[56, 42, 57, 58].
Motivated by the work done in partially occupied lattices, in this paper,
we incorporate population density and individual mobility into the original
OPGG introduced in ref.[20] and play the game in a square lattice with
Moore neighborhood. The main findings of the study are as follows:
(1) With a predefined free-floating probability ξ0, the cooperator fre-
quency fC is determined by population density ρ. There exists a transition
point ρtr, below which fC increases with the rise of ρ while above which fC
decreases with the rise of ρ. With a predefined ρ, fC is determined by ξ0.
Increasing ξ0 leads to a monotonic decrease of fC .
(2) Considering the size distribution P (S) of individual components, we
find that the power-law relation between fC and ξ0 is related to the occurrence
of a giant component Smax ∼ N . Before the giant component occurs, as ρ
increases, P (S) changes from an exponential to a power-law distribution and
the slop of fC as a function of ξ0 decreases with the rise of ρ. After the giant
component occurs, as ρ increases, P (S) changes little and the slope of fC as
a function of ξ0 also changes little with the rise of ρ.
(3)As we keep an eye on the decrease of cooperation in the present model,
the effect of increasing ξ0 with a fixed ρ is similar to the effect of increas-
ing ρ with a fixed ξ0. A theoretical analysis shows that the change of the
frequencies of different strategies in the present model should be determined
by possible collisions between the agents with different strategies. Both the
increase in ρ and the increase in ξ0 would result in more collisions. The more
the collisions between the agents, the lower the levels of cooperation.
The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the op-
tional public goods game with purposive and random movements in a spatial
setting. In Section 3, simulation results about the evolution of competitive
strategies and the local agglomeration of individuals are presented and the re-
lationship between them is discussed. In Section 4, the extinction thresholds
are analyzed with mean field theory, and the possible relations between the
levels of cooperation and the individual collisions are described theoretically.
Section 5 summarizes the paper and gives an outlook for future studies.
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2. The model
A population of N agents is distributed over a square lattice with side
length X and the Moore neighborhood (i.e., degree k = 8), each agent on
each site. For N ≤ X2, the population density is defined as ρ = N
X2
. For
ρ < 1, an agent can move around and occupy the firstly found empty site. In
the present model, there exist two coevolutionary processes: the change of
personal strategies and the movement of the agents. Once the initial position
and the adopted strategy for each agent are set, the system will evolve as
follows.
In the evolution of personal strategies. Initially, there exist three kinds of
agents: cooperators (C), defectors (D) and loners (L). At each Monte Carlo
step (MCS), firstly, each agent interacts with its nearest neighbors and gets
a payoff PC (for cooperators), PD (for defectors) or PL (for loners). Owing
to the neighboring restriction, the interaction group in the present model
should be n ≤ 9. Assuming n = nC+nD+nL, in which nC , nD, nL represent
the numbers of cooperators, defectors and loners in the interaction group
respectively, the payoffs for the agents with different strategies are
PC =
rnC
nC + nD
− 1, (1)
PD =
rnC
nC + nD
, (2)
PL = σ, (3)
in which r (> 1) is the multiplication rate and σ generally satisfies 0 < σ <
r − 1. Therefore, a loner’s payoff should be lower than the payoff of the
agents in a group of cooperators and higher than the payoff of the agents
in a group of defectors. If nC + nD = 1, the cooperator or defector will get
a loner’s payoff. After all the agents have attained their payoffs, they will
make decisions on whether they should update their strategies or not. In
the updating process, an agent i compares its payoff with a randomly chosen
neighbor j’s and adopts j’s strategy with probability
Γi←j =
1
1 + e(Pi−Pj+τ)/κ
, (4)
in which τ and κ represent the cost of strategy change and the environmental
noise respectively.
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The above updating mechanism shows that, in an interaction group, the
evolution of the mixed strategy profile is determined by the scores of different
strategies. Even if the group size is constant, the number of competitive
agents, i.e. cooperators and defectors, will vary with time. Such that the
cyclic oscillations will occur in a fully-occupied network setting.
In relation to the mobility of individuals. For a loner, because it only
relies on a small but fixed payoff and gets nothing from a benefit-seeking
competition, it is not so attractive to stay at its current site and at each
time step it will move randomly with probability ξL. For cooperators and
defectors, the probabilities of leaving the current sites are determined by
whether they are satisfied with the present situation and the possible free-
floating, which are described by the purposive-moving probability ξg and the
free-floating probability ξ0 respectively. The value of ξ0 is predefined and the
value of ξg is determined by the wealth of an agent, which is a cumulative
payoff in the latest T MCS. For an agent i, its wealth is
wi(t) =
t∑
t′=t−T+1
pi(t
′). (5)
For a cooperator or a defector, if its wealth w is less than 0, with probability
ξCD = ξg + ξ0, (6)
in which ξg = 1 − e
w, it leaves its current site and finds an empty site to
stay on. In the present model, to refrain from the random disappearance of
loners, at every MCS, the competitive agents will occasionally become loners
with a small random-flipping probability εL.
A Monte Carlo Step can be summarized as follows. (1) Each agent inter-
acts with its nearest neighbor(s) and gets its wealth w. (2) For a cooperator
or a defector, if its wealth is less than 0, it leaves its current site with prob-
ability ξCD. If its wealth is greater than or equal to 0, it leaves its current
site with probability ξ0. For a loner, it leaves its current site with probability
ξL no matter how rich it is. The moving agents walk randomly and stay
on the firstly found empty sites. For all the agents, they move sequentially.
(3) The wealth of a moving agent is reset to 0 and it will not move in the
next T-1 MCS. (4) Each agent interacts with its nearest neighbor(s) and gets
its payoff P . (5) Each agent i compares its payoff with a randomly chosen
neighbor j’s and adopts neighbor j’s strategy with probability Γi←j. For all
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the agents, they update their strategies synchronously. (6) Cooperators and
defectors become loners with probability εL.
Therefore, in the present model, there are two mechanisms which de-
termine the evolution of cooperation. The payoff determines the replica-
tor dynamics while the wealth determines the mobility dynamics. In rela-
tion to the replicator dynamics. Different from many other PGG models
where the agents collect income simultaneously from several public goods
games[33, 61, 62], in the present model, the agents collect income from a
single public goods game. Our concentration is how the evolutionary dy-
namics in a three-strategy game is affected by the population density and
the free-floating probability. In relation to the local agglomeration. In the
present model, increasing population density has a great influence on the size
distribution of individual components, which is similar to that in the perco-
lation problem. In the physical world, percolation theory is commonly used
to explain connectivity and transport problems. For example, occupy the
sites on a square lattice with probability p. For a small p < pc, only small
isolated clusters, which means a set of neighboring sites occupied, are ob-
served. Increasing p leads to the growth and merging of clusters. For p = pc,
one dominant cluster (infinitely large cluster) occurs and at p=1 all the sites
are occupied. The critical point pc, at which a dominant cluster suddenly
occurs, is known as the percolation threshold. The exact value of the thresh-
old and the system property close to pc are both fundamental problems in
percolation theory, which have been widely studied by physicists[33, 63, 64].
In the present model, the cluster of sites occupied by agglomerated individ-
uals, which is called individual component throughout the paper, should be
affected by population density. Both the size of the largest component and
the distribution of the component sizes can effectively reflect the percola-
tion properties. The relationship between the levels of cooperation and the
occurrence of a dominant component is a favorite of ours.
3. Results and discussions
In this section, we will focus on the roles of population density and free-
floating probability ξ0 in the change of cooperation. Following the work done
in ref.[20], in Monte Carlo simulations we choose the loner’s payoff σ = 1,
the cost of strategy change τ = 0.1 and the environmental noise κ = 0.1.
Throughout the paper, the following parameters are also predefined: the size
of the square latticeM = X×X = 200×200, the random-moving probability
7
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Figure 1: Frequencies of cooperators (circles), defectors (squares), and loners (triangles)
as a function of multiplication rate r in a square lattice with size M = X×X = 200× 200
and Moore neighborhood. Other parameters are σ = 1, τ = κ = 0.1, ξL = 0.1, ξ0 = 0.01,
εL = 0.001 and (a)ρ = 0.3, (b)ρ = 0.5, (c)ρ = 0.8. The results are obtained by averaging
over 10 runs and 1000 MCS after 10000 relaxation MCS in each run.
of loners ξL = 0.1 and the random-flipping C → L (or D → L) probability
εL = 0.001.
Figure 1 shows the frequencies of cooperators, defectors and loners as a
function of r in a square lattice with different population densities ρ = 0.3,
0.5 and 0.8. As what has been found in a fully-occupied regular network[38],
there exist two extinction thresholds rD and rL. For r < rD, loners perform
better than cooperators and defectors so that all the agents become loners
in the final steady state. For rD < r < rL, the three strategies coexist.
The rise of ρ is found to be beneficial for defectors and loners, but not for
cooperators. For r > rL, the survival of cooperators is favored and the loners
go into extinction.
In all the three cases with different ρ, the values of the extinction threshold
rD are the same, rD = σ + 1 = 2, which is also the same as that in a fully-
occupied regular network[65]. Such a result comes from the fact that, with
a small multiplication rate r < 2, even if all the competitive agents are
cooperators, the payoff of a cooperator, PC = r − 1, is less than a loner’s
payoff σ = 1. Therefore, the rock-scissors-paper cycle does not occur and
the system is stuck in the state where all the agents are loners. However, as
we consider the extinction threshold rL, we find it increases with the rise of
ρ. For ρ = 0.3, rL ∼ 4. For ρ = 0.5, rL ∼ 5.5. For ρ = 0.8, rL ∼ 6.5.
The rise of population density can effectively facilitate the interactions
between two agents, which is more possible in the system where the agents
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Figure 2: Frequencies of cooperators (circles), defectors (squares), and loners (triangles)
as a function of multiplication rate r in a square lattice with ρ = 0.3 and (a)ξ0 = 0.01,
(b)ξ0 = 0.05, (c)ξ0 = 0.1. All the other parameters are the same as those in fig.1.
can move freely. In fig.2, we give the frequencies of different strategies as
a function of r with predefined population density ρ = 0.3 and different
ξ0. Comparing the results in fig.2 with those in fig.1, we find that, as to
the change of the frequencies of different strategies, the effect of increasing
ξ0 for a fixed ρ is similar to the effect of increasing ρ for a fixed ξ0( 6= 0).
As ξ0 increases, the cooperator frequency fC decreases while the defector
frequency fD and the loner frequency fL increase within a large range of r.
As ξ0 increases from 0.01 through 0.05 to 0.1, the extinction threshold rL
increases from 4 through 5 to 5.5 accordingly.
The results in fig.1 and fig.2 indicate that the increase in the meeting
probability will lead to the decrease of cooperation, regardless of its coming
from the rise of population density or the rise of free-floating probability.
It is instructive to ask: can we draw a conclusion that the fewer the
chances to meet, the higher the levels of cooperation in the present model?
To examine whether an optimal level of population density exists, in fig. 3
we give the frequencies of the three strategies as a function of ρ for different
ξ0. With a small and fixed ξ0 = 0.01, there exists a transition point ρtr. For
ρ < ρtr, defectors do not exist in the population. The number of cooperators
increases while the number of loners decreases with the rise of ρ. For ρ > ρtr,
the number of cooperators decreases while the number of loners increases with
the rise of ρ. The number of defectors firstly increases and then decreases
with the rise of ρ. Increasing the free-floating probability leads to the decrease
of the levels of cooperation but not the disappearance of the transition point.
As ξ0 ranges from 0.01 to 0.1, the transition point ρtr changes from 0.28 to 0.1
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Figure 3: Frequencies of (a) cooperators, (b) defectors, and (c) loners as a function of pop-
ulation density ρ for r = 2.5 and different ξ0 = 0.01(circles), 0.05(squares), 0.1(triangles).
All the other parameters are the same as those in fig.1.
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Figure 4: Time-dependent frequencies of cooperators with r=2.5, ξL = 0.1, εL = 0.001
and (a) ξ0 = 0.01, ρ = 0.07(black), 0.10(red), 0.25(blue); (b)ξ0 = 0.01, ρ = 0.30(black),
0.35(red), 0.60(blue); (c) ρ = 0.3, ξ0 = 0.01(black), 0.05(red), 0.10(blue).
and the cooperator frequency at the transition point decreases from 1 to 0.86
accordingly. The existence of the transition point indicates that, there exists
an optimal level of population density, with which the system will reach the
highest level of cooperation.
To have a close eye on the evolution of cooperation below and above
the transition point ρtr, in fig. 4(a) and (b) we plot the time-dependent
frequencies of cooperators for different ρ. For comparison, we also plot the
time-dependent cooperator frequencies for different ξ0 in fig. 4(c). For ρ <
ρtr, as the time passes fC becomes stable. The change of ρ only leads to the
change of the average value of cooperator frequencies but not the fluctuations
of fC . For ρ > ρtr, the change of ρ not only results in the change of fC but
also the stability of cooperation. Increasing ρ leads to large fluctuations
of the levels of cooperation. Figure 4(c) shows increasing ξ0 also leads to
large fluctuations of the levels of cooperation. Such results indicate that,
whether the decrease of cooperator frequency results from the increase in ρ
or the increase in ξ0, the large fluctuations of the strategies are detrimental
to cooperation.
To find the relationship between the frequencies of strategies and the
population patterns, in fig.5 we plot the size distribution of individual com-
ponents for different ρ. As ρ increases from 0.3 through 0.4 to 0.5, the size
distribution changes from an exponential distribution through a power-law
distribution to a giant component accompanied by a power-law distribution.
In fig.6 we display the size of the largest component as a function of
ρ. As ρ ranges from 0.1 to 0.3, the size of the largest component has little
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Figure 5: The size distribution of individual components in the evolved system with r=2.5,
ξL = 0.1, εL = 0.001 and different population density ρ = 0.3(circles), 0.4(squares),
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Figure 6: The size of the largest component as a function of population density ρ in the
evolved system with r=2.5, ξL = 0.1 and εL = 0.001.
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equation fC = aξ
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change with the rise of ρ. As ρ ranges from 0.3 to 0.5, the size of the largest
component has a sharp increase with the rise of ρ. For ρ > 0.5, nearly all the
agents are in the same component and the largest component changes little
with the rise of ρ.
Comparing the results in fig.3 with the results in fig.5 and fig.6 we find
that, for low population density, the agents are scattered and the levels of
cooperation are somewhat high. For high population density, nearly all the
agents are in the same component and the levels of cooperation become lower.
Therefore, the results in fig.3 can be understood as follows: For quite low
population density, the dissatisfied agents’ leave makes it impossible for the
defectors to exploit the cooperators and the group of defectors will finally be
doomed by the random-moving loners. And for the cooperators who leave
the competing group, because of the low population density, it is not easy
for them to find another cooperator to collaborate with, and they will finally
become solitary agents whose payoffs are equal to the payoff of a loner. The
occasional C → L (or D → L) random-flipping can protect the loners from
extinction. Therefore, under such an environment, only cooperators and
loners are kept in the final steady state. But for high population density or a
high free-floating probability, it is easy for defectors to intrude into cooperator
clusters and the average level of cooperation will accordingly decrease with
the rise of ρ or the rise of ξ0.
To have a deep understanding of the roles of free-floating in the increase
or decrease of cooperation, in fig.7 we plot fC vs ξ0 for different ρ. From
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fig.7 we find that, for low population density, the frequency of cooperators
decreases sharply with the rise of ξ0. The rise of ρ makes such a changing
tendency become ease. As we fit curves to data points in fig.7, it is found
that fC and ξ0 satisfy the equation fC = aξ
−b
0 , in which a ∼ 0.29, 0.37, 0.39,
0.38, 0.34 and b ∼ 0.24, 0.13, 0.09, 0.07, 0.07 respectively.
Comparing the results in fig.7 with the results in fig.6, we find that the
slope of the fitted line in fig.7 is closely related to the occurrence of the giant
component. As the size of the largest component Smax is quite small, the
slope of the fitted line is steep, which indicates that the change of ξ0 can
greatly affect fC as the agents are scattered. As Smax has a sharp increase,
the slope of the fitted line obviously becomes gentle. As Smax ∼ N , the
change of ρ has little effect on the change of Smax, and accordingly the slope
of the fitted line no longer changes with the rise of ρ. Such results indicate
that, in the present model, the value of b in equation fC = aξ
−b
0 contains the
information of evolutionary patterns. We may effectively figure out the size
distribution of the components from the slope of the fitted line fC(ξ0).
The above simulation results suggest that, as to the decrease of cooper-
ation, the role of increasing ξ0 is similar to the effect of increasing ρ. The
change of cooperation in the present model should come from the change of
the collisions between the agents. Both increasing ξ0 and increasing ρ can
effectively increase the collisions between the agents with different strate-
gies, which makes it easy for the defectors to exploit the cooperators and
accordingly leads to the decrease of cooperation.
4. Theoretical analysis
4.1. Relationship between extinction threshold rL and average size n of in-
teraction groups
In the present model, due to the purposive movement and free-floating of
the agents, the interactive partners in the competing group vary with time,
which will lead to similar results in well-mixed populations, where all the
agents are possible to be chosen as interactive partners in the competing
process. In the following, we make a mean field analysis of the replicator
dynamics and give an approximation of the extinction threshold rL in the
present model.
According to the payoff function, in a randomly chosen group, a defector
always gets a higher payoff than a cooperator. But in mean field analysis, the
system does not evolve according to such payoffs but the averaged payoffs
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for cooperators or defectors which are obtained by averaging over all groups.
In the present model, not all the interaction groups have the same size. In
theoretical analysis, we take the average size of the interaction groups as the
interaction group size, which satisfies n = 9ρ.
Suppose in the well-mixed population, the frequencies of cooperators, de-
fectors and loners are fC , fD and fL respectively, which satisfy the condition
fC + fD + fL = 1. As that in ref.[20], the average payoffs of defectors,
cooperators and loners are
PD = σf
n−1
L + r
fC
1− fL
[1−
1− fnL
n(1− fL)
], (7)
PC = PD − (r − 1)f
n−1
L +
r
n
1− fnL
1− fL
− 1, (8)
PL = σ. (9)
As the multiplication rate r increases to the extinction threshold r = rL, the
loners become extinct and we get fL = 0 and fC + fD = 1. In such a case,
the payoffs of defectors and cooperators become
PD =
n− 1
n
rLfC , (10)
PC =
n− 1
n
rLfC +
1
n
rL − 1. (11)
On the condition that PC = PD, where cooperators and defectors can coexist,
we obtain the extinction threshold
rL = n. (12)
According to the above equation, the extinction threshold rL in the
present model is only related to the average size of interaction groups. The
rise of population density will lead to the rise of the average group size and
thereafter the increase in the extinction threshold. For example, as popula-
tion density ρ increases from ρ = 0.3 to ρ = 0.8, we can estimate that rL
should increase from 2.7 to 7.2. Compared with the simulation results in
fig.1, it is found that, only for an intermediate ρ, the theoretical value of rL
is in accordance with the simulation result. For a small ρ, the theoretical
value of rL is smaller than the simulation result. For a large ρ, the theoretical
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value of rL is greater than the simulation result. Such a difference between
the mean field analysis and the simulation data may come from the dynamic
connectivity between the agents. The above theoretical analysis is only a
rough approximation for rL. It has been found that the effect of individual
movements can not be handled within the mean-field analysis[33]. That is
the reason why the effect of the moving-probability is omitted in our analysis.
How to give an accurate approximation for rL is still an open question for
future studies.
4.2. Relationship between free-floating probability ξ0 and levels of cooperation
The simulation results show that the free-floating of the agents has great
impact on the change of cooperation. In the following, by theoretical analysis,
we will give a picture of what may be the possible reasons for the occurrence
of such an impact.
In the OPGG, the frequencies of cooperators, defectors and loners are
determined by the payoffs to different strategies. In the well-mixed case, the
payoff of each agent is determined by the group size and the status of the
agents in the same group. The larger the group size, the more possible the
immediate interactions between the agents. Just like that in the well-mixed
case, in a mobile environment, although all the agents are on the sites of
a network, they are possible to meet each other within a period of time.
The faster the free-floating of the agents, the more possibly the agents meet
each other within the period of time. Therefore, from the view point of
the probability of meeting between the agents, the effect of increasing the
speed of free-floating is the same as the effect of increasing the group size.
In the following, we will firstly give a functional relation between the group
size and the free-floating probability, and then give a theoretical analysis
of the relationship between the free-floating probability ξ0 and the levels of
cooperation.
In the present model, because all the agents are arranged on the sites
of a square lattice with Moore neighborhood, the number of agents in the
same group should be less than or equal to 9. Considering the effects of
increasing the group size and the speed of free-floating on the increase of
meeting probability, we define the boundary conditions of ξ0 and n as: for
ξ0 ∼ 0, n ∼ 9ρ; for ξ0 ∼ 1, n ∼ 9. Therefore, the following functional relation
between n and ξ0 is adopted,
n(ρ, ξ0) = 9[ρ+ (1− ρ)
1
ξ0 ]. (13)
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Just like that in a well-mixed case[20, 65], for predefined ρ and ξ0, the
difference in the payoff between a defector and a cooperator satisfies the
equation
PD − PC = 1 + (r − 1)f
n(ρ,ξ0)−1
L −
r
n(ρ, ξ0)
1− f
n(ρ,ξ0)
L
1− fL
. (14)
In the steady state, the payoffs of all the agents should be the same, PC =
PD = PL = σ. Therefore, the above equation becomes
1 + (r − 1)f
n(ρ,ξ0)−1
L −
r
n(ρ, ξ0)
1− f
n(ρ,ξ0)
L
1− fL
= 0. (15)
For 0 < fL < 1, the solution of the above equation is the same as the solution
of the following equation
(1− fL) + (r − 1)(1− fL)f
n(ρ,ξ0)−1
L −
r
n(ρ, ξ0)
(1− f
n(ρ,ξ0)
L ) = 0. (16)
Suppose
F (fL, n(ρ, ξ0)) = (1−fL)+(r−1)(1−fL)f
n(ρ,ξ0)−1
L −
r
n(ρ, ξ0)
(1−f
n(ρ,ξ0)
L ). (17)
For the three cases of fL = 0, fL = 1 and fL → 1, we obtain
F (0, n(ρ, ξ0)) = 1−
r
n(ρ, ξ0)
, (18)
F (1, n(ρ, ξ0)) = 0, (19)
F (fL, n(ρ, ξ0)) ≈ (1− r)(n(ρ, ξ0)− 1)(1− fL)
2. (20)
From the equations of (18), (19) and (20) we find that, within the range of
r > 2 and n(ρ, ξ0) > r, as fL changes from 0 to 1, the value of F (fL, n(ρ, ξ0))
changes from F (fL, n(ρ, ξ0)) > 0 to F (fL, n(ρ, ξ0)) < 0. As we check the
sign of ∂
2F (fL,n)
∂f2
L
, we find that it changes at most once within the range of
0 < fL < 1. Such results indicate that, within the range of 0 < fL < 1,
there exists a single solution f trL for equation (16). For fL > f
tr
L , the payoff
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of cooperators is less than the payoff of defectors. For fL < f
tr
L , the payoff
of cooperators is greater than the payoff of defectors.
The above theoretical analysis indicates that, in the present model, in-
creasing ξ0 will lead to the increase in fL and accordingly the decrease of fC ,
which is in accordance with the simulation results found in Fig. 3.
It should be noted that, the above mean field analysis can not accurately
predict the cyclic behavior in the dynamic network and the lattice with mov-
ing agents. Therefore, the present theoretical analysis is only a rough ap-
proximation and the corresponding equations are borrowed from those in a
static network[20, 65]. The strong relevance of local structures needs a gen-
eralized mean-field approximation. A qualitatively correct prediction of the
cyclic behavior in the dynamic network and the lattice with moving agents
is still an open question for future studies.
5. Summary
When facing the choice to win everything or get nothing in a public
goods game, it is reasonable for the individuals to drop out of the game
and enjoy a small but fixed gain, which yields the rock-scissors-paper cycles
of different strategies in the optional public goods game. The oscillatory
cooperation in the optional public goods game displays the sustainability
of cooperation, but it does not tell us on which conditions the system will
evolve to slow oscillations and different levels of stable cooperation can be
reached. By incorporating population density and individual mobility into
the original OPGG, it is found that both the stability and the improvement
of cooperation are connected to the degree of crowdedness and the speed of
free-floating of competitive agents.
For low population density and slow free-floating of competitive agents,
the departure of dissatisfied agents from competing groups makes it easy for
scattered cooperators to agglomerate into cooperator clusters, which results
in the expansion of cooperation. The agents who stay on the original sites are
more possible to form defector clusters, which will finally be doomed by the
random-moving loners. For low population density and fast free-floating of
competitive agents, the exchange of neighbors often takes place and it is easy
for defectors to invade the cooperative clusters. Numerous small components
where cooperators and defectors coexist occur, and the levels of cooperation
decrease. For high population density, because of the percolation effect,
nearly all the agents are merged into the same component. The defectors
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uniformly expand into cooperator territory and the evolutionary dynamics
in the original OPGG is recovered. The relationship between the levels of
cooperation and the free-floating probability is found.
The simulation results in the present model are quite similar to those in
ref.[42, 57], where the effects of different population densities on the evolu-
tion of cooperation are studied depending upon the prisoner’s dilemma, the
snowdrift, the stag-hunt and the public goods game. In a static network
with no moving agents, the optimal population density, with which an opti-
mal level of cooperation can be reached, has been found to be related to the
percolation threshold.
The present model indicates that the existence of different levels of co-
operation in real world should be related to the environmental conditions,
including population density and individual mobility. In the future, similar
environmental conditions should be considered in the game models with con-
tinuous strategy spaces and the generalization of these conditions is a favorite
of ours.
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